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Abstract
Geological disposal facilities will be developed over a period of at least a few decades. 
The design and the nuclear licensing of the underground facilities will be generated dur-
ing the site investigation phase before the regulatory safeguards procedures are applica-
ble. In a geological repository the IAEA will no longer be able to neither to identify nor 
to re-verify the inventory of nuclear material contained because of the backﬁlling of the 
emplacement drifts. Therefore, new geoscientiﬁc techniques have been considered for 
safeguards already before the emplacement of nuclear materials in to the repository.
The examples from the Finnish repository site at Olkiluoto demonstrate that nov-
el evaluation methods and safeguards technologies are to be applied to a geological 
repository. The safeguards conclusions should be based on integrated analysis of sev-
eral non-nuclear techniques. The national approach is based on the combination of 
site inspections and review of construction and monitoring documents. The satellite 
imagery and seismic monitoring is considered to be most relevant to the international 
safeguards. However, these records are to be veriﬁed timely at the site. The continu-
ous generation of knowledge is to be ensured during the pre-nuclear excavation phase 
and results documented representing the veriﬁed “as-built design information”. In 
order to implement the recommended design information veriﬁcation procedures by 
the IAEA and to have granted access to the site and required information, a model 
arrangement is also presented hereby for further consideration in order to facilitate 
the IAEA safeguards mission already in the pre-operational phase of the repository.
OKKO Olli, RAUTJÄRVI Juha. Evaluation of monitoring methods available for safeguards use  
at Olkiluoto geological repository. Report on Task FIN C 1572 of the Finnish Support Programme  
to IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-TR 216. Helsinki 2006. 21 pp + Appendices 6 pp.
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1 Introduction
A geological repository is a unique facility type for 
the perspective of international safeguards because 
of the long construction and operational periods, 
the impossible access to emplaced spent fuel that 
cannot be re-veriﬁed and the continuing societal 
acceptance, environmental safety and safeguards 
requirement after facility closure. Because of these, 
different design information generation and veri-
ﬁcation schedules apply than have typically been 
used when applying safeguards to surface facilities 
(IAEA, 1997).
Different methods and techniques shall be used 
to establish and maintain coherent and reliable 
picture of the ongoing excavation and operation 
activities. These includes methods and techniques 
that enable the safeguards system to provide cred-
ible assurances of the absence of diversion of the 
disposed spent nuclear fuel and of that of unde-
clared nuclear activities near or at the repository 
must be ensured during the whole lifetime.
The generic safeguards approach must be applied 
taking in to account the above conditions and the 
local geological features, facility concept, excavation 
and research activities, and the established safety, 
security and safeguards practices implemented 
within the existing legal framework. In application 
particular notice must be taken of the fact that the 
nuclear fuel elements are not accessible for veriﬁca-
tion after encapsulation and ﬁnal disposition of the 
canisters.
The Finnish Government set the guidelines for 
the long-term policy of nuclear waste management 
in Finland in 1983. In particular, the decision was to 
guide to preparations towards the direct disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository in case 
it was not reprocessed. After extensive geological in-
vestigations, Finland designated the Olkiluoto area 
for its national geological repository in May 2001. 
In addition to the surface and borehole geological 
investigations, an underground tunnel system is 
planned to be excavated in the Olkiluoto repository 
site for the rock characterization purposes during 
the pre-nuclear phase. These galleries are supposed 
to form a part of the ﬁnal repository, in case the 
investigations conﬁrm this to be the acceptable 
solution that isolates radioactive materials safely 
from the biosphere. According to the Decision-in-
Principle the solution shall not be harmful to the 
environment, people and property.
The implementing company, Posiva Oy, was 
licensed for the excavation of the underground rock 
characterisation facility as the ﬁrst stage towards 
the repository in 2003 by the local municipality of 
Eurajoki according to the national civil construction 
legislation. Preliminary works begun in 2003, and 
the excavations started in 2004. In order to facilitate 
safeguards, the implementing company provides the 
authority the required documents, including such 
as progress reports and planned activities timely. 
In addition, the main repository drawings and a 
scientiﬁc monitoring programme are also published 
(Posiva 2003). The information from this geological, 
hydrogeological and rock mechanical monitoring 
and research programme to ensure the integrity 
of the geological repository, including access routes 
thereto can also be evaluated by the authorities for 
safety and also for safeguards purposes so that also 
the necessary safeguards measures can be imple-
mented efﬁciently, in cost-effective manner.
The regional procedure to generate a traditional 
Design Information based on Euratom Regulation is 
not applicable to safeguards yet, because no nuclear 
material is intended to be transferred into these 
research premises during the investigation phase 
of about 6–8 years, nor during the licensed nuclear 
construction period of another 6–8 years. The opera-
tional licensing including emplacement of nuclear 
materials is scheduled to take place by 2020. The 
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excavation work aiming at the disposal is already 
declared to the IAEA under the Article 2a(x) of the 
Protocol Additional as the State’s general plan to 
develop the nuclear fuel cycle. This does not initiate 
the recommended safeguards activities since the 
access to the premises for veriﬁcation routines is not 
granted implicitly. However, the IAEA was provided 
with the pertinent information on the excavation 
plans in 2003. Moreover, the national requirements 
to generate and verify Design Information as a part 
of SSAC functions were established in 2004. The 
proper Design Information and related Basic Tech-
nical Characteristics will be provided in accordance 
with the Safeguards Agreement and in compliance 
with the appropriate Design Information Question-
naire to be provided by the IAEA.
The Geological Repository Safeguards Experts 
Group (Member State Support Programme tasks 
JNT/C1204 and C1226) pointed out that the in-
terface issues between IAEA safeguards and ra-
dioactive waste management should be addressed 
and the use of safety and operational information 
would make the IAEA safeguards more effective 
and efﬁcient for geological repository facilities. 
The Expert Group’s report addresses geological 
repositories during the pre-operational, operational, 
and post-closure phases. The geological repository 
and its operations will be monitored during the 
pre-operational and operational phases, and likely 
during the post-closure phase, to conﬁrm the as-
sumptions that
1. the repository is operated safely and will effec-
tively isolate the spent fuel from the biosphere, 
and
2. the contained nuclear materials are not diverted 
to nuclear explosives or unknown purposes.
Discussions on the site-speciﬁc approaches have 
been initiated, particularly during the Experts 
Group meetings in Oskarshamn 2002 and in Rauma 
2003. The recommendations generated by the group 
(Okko 2004) focused on the potential information 
needs and exchange routines. Due to the complexity 
of the task and veriﬁcation associated constrains, 
the need to develop competencies at the IAEA to 
evaluate and verify geological information to be pro-
vided from the repository development project was 
also indicated. The Finnish Task C 01374 presented 
the national approach to establish the site-speciﬁc 
safeguards approach (Okko & Rautjärvi 2004).
The recent Integrated Safeguards approach at 
the IAEA should eventually enable the IAEA to 
decrease the amount of routine work in its safe-
guards activities. The aim is to reduce workload at 
the power reactors in Finland (see Anttila 2000), 
but construction of a geological repository is not yet 
addressed appropriately. However, the above recom-
mendations concerning the disposal facility urge to 
increase safeguards activities from the present 25 
annual person-days in Finland remarkably.
This report is concentrated to evaluate the 
methods used in the comprehensive monitoring 
programme for the long-term safety evaluations 
and environmental assessment carried out at the 
Olkiluoto repository site in order to identify the 
individual monitoring methods that can be used by 
the IAEA while developing its safeguards approach 
for the geological repository in Finland.
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2 IAEA safeguards recommendations 
for geological repositories
The objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely 
detection of diversion of signiﬁcant quantities of 
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities 
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, 
and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early 
detection (INFCIRC/153) and to provide credible 
assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear 
materials and activities in a State (INFCIRC/540), 
in this case in Finland. The IAEA is, on its part, 
trusted to ensure the application of all measures 
available to it and, in cooperation with Finland, to 
implement the respective functions so as to meet 
the safeguards objectives.
In comparison to above-ground facilities, at 
which the IAEA has experience verifying design 
information and implementing safeguards monitor-
ing and veriﬁcation measures, sub-surface geologi-
cal repository safeguards present also challenges 
of unique quality. First, the space, into which the 
repository will be constructed, is not directly acces-
sible and cannot be directly observed. This implies 
that methods and techniques not normally used for 
safeguards must be used for the assurances of the 
absence of undeclared structures and activities. 
Second, once canisters are emplaced, the IAEA will 
no longer be able to neither to identify nor to re-
verify the inventory of nuclear material contained 
in the repository because of the backﬁlling of the 
emplacement drifts.
Geological disposal facilities will be developed 
over a period of at least a few decades. Key deci-
sions, e.g. on the disposal concept, site selection, 
design, construction in different phases, operational 
management and closure, are expected to be made 
in a series of steps. Decisions will be made based on 
the information generated and thus made available 
to the key actors at each step and on the conﬁ-
dence that can be placed in that information. The 
step–by–step approach also offers opportunities for 
independent technical reviews, regulatory reviews, 
and political and public involvement. During the 
pre-nuclear phase, and later during the construc-
tion of a licensed nuclear facility, emplacement 
of containers and operation and at closure, the 
understanding must be sufﬁcient to support the 
establishment and implementation of the necessary 
safety and safeguards regulatory requirements.
In 1988, the IAEA held its ﬁrst Advisory Group 
meeting to address safeguards for the ﬁnal disposal 
of spent fuel in geological repositories. The IAEA’s 
Programme for the Development of Safeguards 
Approaches for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel 
in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was begun in 
1994 and, in 1998, provided recommendations to the 
IAEA on generic safeguards approaches for spent 
fuel conditioning facilities and for operating and 
closed geological repositories.
The following is considered applicable:
a. Safeguards system shall be based on: establish-
ment and veriﬁcation of the initial information 
of the rock volume aimed at accommodating the 
repository and the essential services; generation 
of design information during excavations, con-
struction and installation and operation of the 
repository as well as veriﬁcation of receipts into 
and ﬂow within the repository; other pertinent 
information relating to measures aimed at en-
suring that no nuclear material can be removed 
without notice by any declared or undeclared 
access routes; and maintenance of continuity of 
knowledge on the excavated premises and on the 
nuclear material content.
b. Safeguards requirements shall be integrated 
into the repository design already at a non-
nuclear construction stage in order to establish 
functional, non-intrusive, and cost-effective safe-
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guards measures. Consultations between the 
State and the IAEA should, therefore, start at 
that stage to agree on the safeguards measures 
in the repository.
c. State shall provide the Agency with the per-
tinent information such as general plans of a 
geological repository site; description of intended 
underground works, and any other information 
such as excavation plans, progress reports and 
notiﬁcations that are identiﬁed by the IAEA as 
relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
d. The Agency, in collaboration with the State, 
shall establish all pertinent information about 
the original undisturbed site preferably before 
excavation begins, in order to establish initial 
knowledgebase that will enable parties to ensure 
cost-effectiveness in planning for safeguards 
approach and in application of respective meas-
ures and in establishment of implementation 
practices.
e. After the repository has been back-ﬁlled and 
sealed the geological repositories is subject to, 
environmental monitoring and societal controls 
as will be deemed necessary at that time and 
that for as long as the safeguards agreement 
remains in force. The safeguards applied should 
provide a credible assurance of non-diversion 
during the whole life time of the repository.
Monitoring will be required during each step or 
phase of disposal facility development. Purposes 
include provision of baseline information for site 
understanding, assurance of operational safety and 
assessment of repository performance, and measure-
ments to conﬁrm conditions consistent with present 
and long-term safety and safeguards requirements. 
These relate to relevant geological site, excavated 
ramps and other premises, shafts and tunnels, 
drainages, material and waste handling and other 
equipment, and radiological control. Monitoring 
programmes must be designed and implemented 
so as not to impair the safety in operation and the 
overall level of long term safety.
In 1998, the IAEA established the Geological 
Repository Safeguards Experts Group to provide 
advice on safeguards technology development for 
geological repositories and on implementing the 
generic safeguards approach at speciﬁc facilities. 
The pre-operational phase is deﬁned to be the 
period from designation, by a State, of a site for 
construction of a geological repository for spent 
fuel disposal up through receipt of the ﬁrst disposal 
container. The safeguards measures are proposed in 
the report of the Geological Repository Safeguards 
Experts Group (IAEA, 2003).
The application and practical implementation 
of recommended measures and techniques need to 
be discussed and negotiated between the IAEA and 
the Member State owing to the nature of the chal-
lenges and the fact that there are within the IAEA 
safeguards system no applicable guidelines, for 
example in the form of design information question-
naires (DIQ), available yet. Also no experience in 
implementing the IAEA safeguards system during 
the pre-nuclear phase of the repository development 
exists.
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3 Monitoring methods and 
procedures for the Olkiluoto site
3.1 Model repository approach
The primary safeguards objective is to ensure that 
no diversion or reprocessing of nuclear material 
takes place undetected from the time the mate-
rial arrives in the repository until the closure and 
sealing of the repository facilities. The generic 
safeguards approaches for operating and closed 
deep geological repositories were deﬁned in the 
IAEA (1997) report for a model repository. These 
safeguards approaches were deﬁned more in detail 
by the experts’ group meeting in 2002 (IAEA, 2003). 
The safeguards system requirements are based 
primarily on the need to establish initial knowl-
edgebase and to maintain ‘continuity of knowledge’ 
(CoK) on the design of the repository and on nuclear 
material accountancy. The recommended safeguards 
approach will be to use item accounting supported 
by a reliable and comprehensive containment and 
surveillance (C/S) system above ground to verify, 
inter alia, the transfer and ﬂow of spent fuel con-
tainers. Design information veriﬁcation (DIV) is 
the recommended primary safeguards measure in 
the underground areas of the facility. DIV in this 
instance could include geophysical techniques.
The safeguards approach will depend on the 
adopted disposal concept (e.g., immediate backﬁlling 
or repository kept open until ﬁnal closure). Because 
of the undesirability of returning and opening a 
canister containing irradiated nuclear materials 
and the inaccessibility of emplaced canisters for 
veriﬁcation of any description (either canister 
identiﬁcation or radiological inventory), a very high 
degree of reliability is needed in the safeguards 
system. This will be achieved by the use of intrinsi-
cally reliable systems with multiple redundancies. 
The safeguards approach may be described as fol-
lows. The containment and surveillance system at 
repository openings may be an integrated system of 
motion and radiation detectors, optical surveillance 
and safeguards seals. These will be designed for 
independent operation and with the ability to pro-
vide remote monitoring/analysis of authenticated 
signals. These systems may reduce the presence 
of inspectors on the site. The intention will be to 
provide the inspection authority with a high level 
of assurance that ﬁlled casks received at the surface 
of the repository are transferred underground to the 
emplacement vaults without tampering or diver-
sion. All potential access points to the repository 
would be rigorously monitored to ensure that no 
undeclared items leave or enter the underground 
facilities. The instrumental monitoring result will 
be subject to evaluation in order to be able to launce 
timely and effective response in case of detection of 
an event of concern.
Design information veriﬁcation would be peri-
odically implemented to provide assurance that the 
physical structure and operations of the repository 
were consistent with the plans and programme of 
activities supplied by the State authority to the 
inspection authority. If necessary, geophysical tech-
niques might be employed as a means of supporting 
DIV activities as well as optical surveillance. Addi-
tional safeguards measures are possible depending 
on the actual design of the facility (IAEA 1997).
The IAEA Expert Group visited in Olkiluoto the 
existing and operating underground repositories 
as well the site selected for the repository of spent 
fuel in 2003. The Group formulated a set of recom-
mendations how to proceed with the development 
of possible safeguards approaches (Okko 2004). The 
suitability of the proposed geophysical methods, 
environmental sampling, and satellite and aerial 
surveillance techniques was discussed with respect 
to the natural conditions of the Olkiluoto area. The 
inspection regime and timely evaluation process 
should be by the key elements of the approach to 
be established.
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3.2 Remote safeguards monitoring
The access tunnel to the Olkiluoto repository, called 
Onkalo during the pre-nuclear phase, will advance 
20–25 m in a week, and 1 km in a year. The dura-
tion of the excavation of the Onkalo will thus be 
6–7 years. After the pre-nuclear period, the reposi-
tory will consists of the access tunnel, shafts and 
investigation level galleries (Figure 1). In addition, 
the underground construction needs supporting 
infrastructure to be developed at the site. The 
excavation of a tunnel will introduce environmental 
effects that may be detected indirect using satellite 
imagery, airborne methods or geophysical monitor-
ing techniques.
The baseline of natural conditions was reported 
(Posiva 2003) before the underground operations 
began at the repository in 2004. Moreover, remote 
sensing methods were applied for safeguards dem-
Figure 1. The schematic underground rock characterization laboratory Onkalo to be excavated at Olkiluoto. The 
disposal tunnels may be constructed from the characterisation tunnel. (Posiva Oy, 2003).
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onstrations in the pre-excavation phase (Okko, 
2003). At present, the Olkiluoto Island is an active 
area since there several construction projects going 
on. The satellite imagery of 2002 was repeated 
in 2005 and an image comparison procedure was 
applied to ﬁnd out changes between the imageries. 
The changes are illuminated using red colour in 
Figure 2.
Before the construction of the Onkalo explora-
tory gallery was initiated, the bedrock remained 
undisturbed except for the boreholes used for initial 
site characterization. The removal of vegetation and 
soils as well as the construction of several civil and 
nuclear buildings, roads and other objects can be 
located in Figure 2. The new reactor is constructed 
on the left near the existing facilities; whereas the 
repository is constructed near the small reservoir 
seen on the right. In particular, a land or rock ﬁll 
Figure 2. Satellite imagery detects major construction-induced changes on surface at Olkiluoto. 
The landﬁll area in the middle contains extracted rock masses from several construction activi-
ties. The repository site is on the right, near the small reservoir.
Changes detected between 2002 and 
2005 imageries are shown using red 
colour on the 2005 image. 
Olkiluoto area on 16.6.2005
Olkiluoto area on 9.9.2002
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area is emerged in the middle of the Olkiluoto Is-
land. However, the rock masses excavated at several 
locations cannot be located for their origins. There 
are also newly constructed surface connections be-
tween the repository area and the declared nuclear 
facilities as well as connections to “undeclared” civil 
buildings. The rock masses extracted and stored 
on the surface could correspond to a 2…3-km long 
tunnel network underground – depending on the 
tunnel dimensions. Therefore, the existence and 
locations of these tunnels can only be veriﬁed in situ 
at the site. On June 16, 2005 the tunnel length in 
the repository exceeded to 500 m; whereas, most of 
those rock masses originated from foundation works 
at other locations. Although the safety requirements 
for the nuclear waste management require that the 
disposal site will be an isolated one, the IAEA safe-
guards presence at the site is essential and desired 
for the international conﬁdence building on the 
absence of clandestine underground operations.
3.3 Monitoring for safety 
assessment and environment
The characterisation programme is carried out to 
update and increase conﬁdence in the descriptive 
model of Olkiluoto bedrock in such a manner to 
that it will serve the needs of the preliminary safety 
assessment report required in the construction 
licence application. During the characterisation 
programme new techniques to characterise volumes 
of rock from the underground will be developed and 
demonstrated. Moreover, the rock volumes that 
could be suitable for housing the ﬁnal repository 
will be identiﬁed. The characterisation programme 
will be followed continuously and reviewed in 3 year 
intervals by the national authority. The reviews 
will also focus on the safeguards relevance of the 
observations.
The underground construction will affect the 
surrounding rock mass and the groundwater ﬂow 
system. The expected hydraulic disturbances are 
simulated by Löfman & Meszaros (2005). In case 
the tunnels will be left open without grouting strong 
inﬂow of water may cause a sink of 200 m in the 
water table. Also the upconing of deep saline water 
can be expected. Tight grouting can reduce the de-
pression of ground water table to 10 m. The changes 
in rock stresses including the tectonic movements 
in the land uplift zone of Finland are expected to 
introduce microseismic and seismic events.
The progress in the excavation work and the 
responses in the monitoring programme is followed 
and evaluated by an international regulatory expert 
group which support the safety-case evaluation. 
These evaluations (e.g. Cosgrove et al. 2003) discuss 
the uncertainty analysis of the geological data, but 
can also be studied to support the safeguards ap-
proach at the site. The IAEA can be recommended 
to join the evaluation work in order establish the 
recommended expertise to generate site under-
standing at the Agency in the non-intrusive manner 
as applicable.
The information collected for characterisation 
and monitoring by independent qualiﬁed subcon-
tractors will be assessed in an integrated modelling. 
The aim of this modelling is both to successively 
enhance the description and understanding of the 
rock volume around Onkalo and to assess potential 
impacts of the construction and operation of Onkalo 
(Posiva 2003). Integration between monitoring 
and modelling in different scientiﬁc disciplines, 
including safeguards aspects, is essential during the 
development of the Onkalo.
The monitoring programme for site understand-
ing and long-term safety is subdivided into
• Rock mechanics
• Hydrology and hydrogeology
• Geochemistry
• Other disturbances
The environmental monitoring programme is sub-
divided into
• Landscape properties
• Input for biosphere modelling
• Input to environmental impact evaluations
The rock mechanics monitoring includes; i.a., dis-
placement measurements at tunnel walls, stress 
measurements including loads in rock bolts, analy-
sis excavation damaged zone. The tectonic move-
ments are monitored at the surface by precise 
levelling, GPS-surveying and seismic monitoring. 
Rock temperature monitoring is including in the 
rock mechanical part of the programme.
The extensive hydrological monitoring pro-
gramme will continue and focus on in ﬂow rate in 
the tunnels, changes induced in hydraulic heads 
and evaluation of the hydraulic network. The saline 
water interface will be monitored using geophysical 
wireline logging and groundwater sampling in deep 
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boreholes. Geophysical resistivity and electromag-
netic monitoring are planned at certain locations 
to map changes in the conductivity structure of 
the rock mass. Most of the monitoring data are col-
lected in measuring campaign for hydraulic heads, 
groundwater ﬂow and hydraulic conductivity. The 
campaigns are carried out weekly and automatic 
motoring devices may be involved in the data col-
lection procedures.
The geochemical monitoring programme will 
continue to analyse the ground water chemistry 
in boreholes. In addition, the in ﬂow to the tun-
nels will be analyses for the water chemistry. The 
effects of cementation and organic materials and 
the movements of redox front are of particular 
interest. These topics require calculations with 
geochemical modelling codes. Equilibrium and mass 
balance approaches are basic tools in understanding 
processes like mixing, pH-Eh evolutions and salin-
ity distribution. Furthermore, long-term evolution 
and predictive problems related to hydrochemical 
evolution requires coupling of hydrogeological and 
geochemical modelling approaches.
Environmental monitoring data are used in 
evaluating the environmental impact of the progress 
in underground works. The biosphere modelling is 
focused to analyse the drainage areas, terrestrial, 
limnic and marine/brackish systems and will make 
use of the environmental programme operated by 
the adjacent nuclear power plant. The environmen-
tal data collection supports also the hydrogeological 
analysis of the repository site. In addition, the 
inventories for terrestrial animals and vegetation 
are updated annually.
The monitoring programme is reported annual 
for its individual disciplines (Rock Mechanics by 
Riikonen 2005, Hydrology by Ahokas et. al 2005, 
Geochemistry by Hirvonen 2005, Foreign Materials 
by Juhola 2005, Environment by Haapanen 2005), 
annually, e.g. Posiva Working Reports 2005-27 
… 2005-31. During the ﬁrst excavation year the 
disturbances have been minimal, even smaller as 
expected. There rock quality has required almost 
continuous grouting around the tunnel which has 
reduced the inﬂow water more than assumed in the 
modelling work.
In order to make an access to the repository, the 
crystalline bedrock must be blasted; maybe a large 
coring machine could be applied for tunnelling. 
These activities introduce noise and vibrations 
that might be detectable. The removed rock mass 
must also be stored or hided somewhere. The 
mass transfer will introduce activities that can be 
detected. Moreover, the maintenance of a tunnel 
needs electricity for drainage and ventilation, which 
requires installations that are detectable. Also the 
consequences of a tunnel would be observed the 
hydrological monitoring of the repository. The most 
advanced and systematically applied site investiga-
tion methods are described by Öhberg 2006). These 
methods are listed in Appendix 1 in which these are 
also evaluated for their safeguards-relevance. The 
most promising methods are the continuous seismic 
and hydraulic monitoring systems to obtain indica-
tions on unexpected events. The environmental 
analysis of the monitoring data can also support 
the safeguards objectives, but inconclusiveness may 
retain in these analysis.
There are several geophysical techniques used 
in the monitoring that are applicable to detects 
voids and openings within the bedrock, although 
the possible existence of a clandestine tunnel at 
the repository site of Olkiluoto is difﬁcult to prove. 
However, the effectiveness of geophysics, mainly 
active seismic or electromagnetic methods depends 
on the size and distance of the object. Also the 
physical parameters between the void (water, air) 
and the host rock affect the detection ability. The 
sounding frequency and other operator-dependent 
sounding parameters should also be deﬁned accord-
ing to the (unknown) target. These methods are 
applied to map the water-bearing or ﬁlled fractures 
in the bedrock. It can be assumed that the number 
geophysical anomalies interpreted to originate 
from unknown bedrock features between known 
boreholes is rather high. Therefore, the direct map-
ping of unexpected tunnels beyond the reinforced 
tunnel wall using geophysical techniques in the 
repository may generate fuzzy information also in 
the geological bedrock modelling. The origins of all 
of anomalies can not be veriﬁed without extensive 
drilling and coring (see e.g. Saksa et al. 2005). The 
applicability of geophysical methods in cost-effective 
safeguards is not very obvious.
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4 National safeguards measures 
at Olkiluoto repository site
The national system of Finland is implementing the 
necessary safeguards measures, carrying out the re-
spective functions, creating the knowledgebase and 
maintaining of the continuity of that knowledge for 
the generations to follow and during the whole life-
time of the repository. The reporting of the progress 
in the construction of the underground repository is 
incorporated to the strengthened national SSAC-
functions, thus enabling also the IAEA to apply its 
respective safeguards measures.
The Finnish national safeguards system for the 
repository consist of generation of relevant data 
and information, ﬁeld audits and veriﬁcations as 
well as review of the progress in tunnelling works 
and site characterisation. The safeguards-related 
audits and veriﬁcations will be also focused on the 
contracted companies and their procedures. The na-
tional competent authority STUK will, in addition, 
use information from independent surveillance or 
monitoring techniques. The national system func-
tions are implemented in such a manner that the 
IAEA efﬁcient and cost-effective safeguards for the 
Olkiluoto repository site are enabled.
4.1 Underground design information
The design information generation and veriﬁca-
tion for safeguards purposes is incorporated to the 
progress in tunnelling and to the geological map-
ping of the tunnel walls. The tunnels and the shaft 
will be reinforced by bolts, sprayed concrete, grout-
ing and possibly also steel mesh or cast concrete 
structure reinforcements according to the results 
of rock mechanical investigations. In order to limit 
groundwater ingress the tunnels will be pre-grouted 
and post-grouted according to the results of rock 
mechanical investigations. The methods and the 
amount of reinforcement and grouting will depend 
on local conditions, and may thus change even 
within short distances along the tunnel wall. This 
requires coordinated investigation, design, construc-
tion and inspection activities to recognise the most 
suitable solutions in advance, and to handle possible 
unexpected changes in the layout of the Onkalo.
The excavation procedure requires the genera-
tion of rock spaces for the drilling, blasting, loading 
and transport vehicles to pass each other. These 
spaces are of the order of the volume needed for 
the treatment of a spent fuel transport canister. 
Therefore, it is essential to map and verify these 
spaces and corresponding virgin rock walls after 
the excavation (see Figure 3). These spaces can be 
left as open volumes or used for other construction, 
research, maintenance or safety functions.
The veriﬁcation of the progress in tunnelling is 
carried out in such a manner that the excavated 
volume can be documented in concordance with the 
geological investigations before the rock walls are 
reinforced. After the reinforcement, the existence 
of any undeclared voids is very difﬁcult to prove 
without disturbing the operational safety of the un-
derground gallery and later, that of the facility. The 
excavated rock spaces are declared by the operator 
timely, as shown in Figure 3. The reinforced tunnel 
sections are documented separately once a decision 
for the use of spray concrete etc. for operational 
safety reasons is made. The tunnel sections are 
inspected by the national safeguards and safety 
authority before each of the scheduled casting cam-
paigns. The impregnate rock walls will form the 
repository containment in which the facility instal-
lations can be constructed safely. The containment 
features of the excavated rock space are identiﬁed, 
authenticated and documented, thus providing the 
basis for license application and the Design Infor-
mation at the given time in the future.
The measurement of the excavated rock spaced 
is carried by traditional surveying techniques 
as well as by laser scanning, which gives for 
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analytical and documentary purposes a detailed 
3-D space representation of the tunnel surface. 
Repeated surveys will be analysed as quantitative 
displacement measures of the safety analysis. 
The documentation will be complemented also by 
visual observations, photography etc. needed for the 
geological characterisation of features at rock walls. 
The resolution of any of these methods is considered 
satisfactory for safeguards purposes. The authentic-
ity and relevance of the documentation is ensured 
by in-situ presence of inspectors. The national 
system functions include visual in-situ veriﬁcation 
documents to be maintained for the continuity 
of knowledge. During the ﬁrst year of excavation 
works, the national authority carried out in total 14 
inspections at the site, 9 of these were documented 
also for their safeguards-relevancy. There is access 
to the underground repository during the monthly 
follow-up meetings and during the international 
evaluation of the site characterisation and monitor-
ing programme. Safeguards inspections are carried 
out on ad hoc principle or before the announced 
casting campaigns.
4.2 Geophysical monitoring
A wide range of geophysical techniques is applied 
to generate raw data for the site characterisation 
of Olkiluoto. The data will be interpreted for the 
geological characterisation of the bedrock and 
especially for the location and characterisation of 
zones of mechanical or hydrological interest in the 
safety assessment. These interpretations will also 
be reviewed for their safeguards-relevancy. The 
rock mechanical monitoring is considered to will 
give the most safeguards-relevant information. 
Therefore, the microseismic data included in the 
rock mechanics part (Saari 2005) is applied as 
safeguards-relevant declaration by the operator 
(Figure 4). The excavation-introduced seismicity 
will also be studied using a net work of microseismic 
stations at the investigation site. These seismic 
records are then inversed to estimate their source 
locations in the bedrock volume. The blasting, i.e., 
the explosions shot to proceed with the tunnels are 
also recorded with this seismic network operated 
by the subcontractor of the implementer, Posiva 
Figure 3. The ”as built design information” of the Onkalo ramp at the scale to be veriﬁed for safeguards pur-
poses.
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Oy. The interpretations are also reviewed by the 
national authority, STUK.
The microseismic records are analysed for the 
source locations of the explosions. An example is 
presented in Figure 4 which shows explosions both 
from “declared” and “undeclared” activities. Most of 
the “undeclared” activities can be traced to locations 
where authorised construction actives are taking 
place. The seismic analysis can be compared with 
the satellite imagery of Figure 4. In the seismic 
data set two clusters are to be identiﬁed: the 
progress in tunnelling work at the repository and 
the foundation work at the “undeclared” visitors’ 
centre. Excavation work at the reactor site consists 
of separate working areas or the microseismic 
network/algorithm tracing the source location is 
not adequate for this source area. In addition 
there are several other seismic events that cannot 
be identiﬁed exactly. It is obvious that these are 
individually related to vibrations at landﬁll areas 
and near roads, and thus having no safeguards 
relevancy. However, the main conclusion from these 
seismic records is that it is conﬁrmed that there 
are no underground connections made (during the 
monitoring period) between the construction sites 
observed in the satellite imagery.
Figure 4. Seismic epicentres as traced their source location in February 2005. The Onkalo ramp in marked by the 
orange triangle and the repository area is dashed bluish.
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5 Recommendations to the IAEA 
safeguards at the Olkiluoto repository
The model repository approach would require 
practically continuous human and instrumental 
presence at the site during the whole life time of the 
repository. The maintenance of the IAEA monitoring 
equipment would require also technical people to 
be reached at short notice. Assuming that there are 
at the IAEA inspectors who are competent to carry 
out the continuous design information veriﬁcation 
and geo-scientiﬁc monitoring and evaluation, it is 
estimated that at least 1.5 – 2.0 person-years are 
needed annually at the site in the pre-operational 
phase of the repository. In addition, there is an obvi-
ous need for geo-scientiﬁc staff at the head quarters. 
This increases the inspection activities remarkable 
from the present 1 person-month spent annually in 
Finland, in contrast to the Integrated Safeguards 
aim to reduce the inspection activities.
The IAEA is recommended to make full use of 
Finnish national safeguards system, its ﬁndings 
and the existing technical possibilities so as to 
ensure cost-effectiveness of its safeguards and also 
to avoid unnecessary burden on the operator and 
the national system. In particular, its approach to 
safeguarding the pre-nuclear phase of the reposi-
tory construction should include the following:
1) Audit of the national system elements and their 
safeguards functions.
2) Examine progress reports and the as-build 
design information.
3) Assess the ﬁndings of the national monitoring 
system so as to be assured of the absence of 
undeclared activities, structures, equipment 
and materials considered to be of safeguards 
relevance.
4) Access on short notice the enabling national 
system elements and, as required by the IAEA 
system, also the geographical site, buildings, 
equipment and excavated premises to verify in-
situ (by use of proven methods) the correspond-
ence with the progress reports and as-build 
design information.
5) Approach the national system in case of anoma-
lies, inconsistencies or questions of relevance 
for safeguards so as to obtain required clariﬁca-
tions.
The cost-effectiveness in implementation of the 
IAEA safeguards measures could be based on the 
short notice random visits to the repository and 
periodic follow-up of the site characterisation and 
monitoring programme performance. The visits and 
adjoining veriﬁcation activities applying mainly 
visual observations or surveying techniques might 
be carried out in concordance to routine inspections 
to the near-by located nuclear facilities to avoid 
travel costs or in an unannounced mode.
The monitoring programme performance and re-
sults are followed by the scientiﬁc expert group that 
also inspects quality and safety assessment of the 
repository annually. The participation in this group 
might be the most convenient and cost-effective way 
to maintain the required level of site understanding, 
thereby contributing to the safeguards evaluation. 
This procedure that could include the as-built 
design veriﬁcation would require few person-days 
annually and would include assessment of the 
monitoring programme results and performance 
from the safeguards relevant points of view.
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In general, the information needs and exchange 
routines are to be deﬁned, since there are no le-
gally binding obligations, neither in the Safeguards 
Agreement nor in the Additional Protocol guiding 
the State and the IAEA in the implementation 
of safeguards on geological repository in the pre-
nuclear phase. The pre-nuclear phase should be 
declared as a general plan to the development of 
nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, the notiﬁcation, 
reporting and other communication formalities as 
well as access procedures have to be negotiated and 
agreed with the relevant parties. A draft arrange-
ment that takes into account Olkiluoto site speciﬁc 
aspects and the existing national safeguards system 
elements is presented in Appendix 2.
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6 Conclusions
The ﬁnal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the 
geological repository at Olkiluoto was accepted be 
the local municipality, State authorities, and ﬁnally 
endorsed by the Parliament of Finland in 2001. The 
site investigations proceeded to the underground 
phase in 2004 when the excavation of the under-
ground tunnel system for bedrock characterisation 
at repository site began. Referring to the recom-
mendations generated in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s Programme for Development of 
Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in 
Geological Repositories, the implementation of the 
necessary safeguards measures by the national 
safeguards authority was initiated in 2004. The 
IAEA is recommended to make full use of this 
strengthened national system.
The main safeguards objectives at the present 
pre-nuclear phase are: 1) Generation and veriﬁca-
tion of the as-build design data that corresponds 
with the excavated rock space and its geometrical 
volume 2) Assessment of all available safeguards 
relevant monitoring data to assure the absence of 
undeclared safeguards-relevant activities at or near 
the repository.
The extensive geo-environmental monitoring 
data collected continuously primarily for site un-
derstanding and safety evaluation purposes are also 
accessible, as relevant, for the safeguards purposes. 
Integrated evaluation of the information generated 
by these monitoring tools can reveal indications con-
cerning undeclared activities near or at the reposi-
tory, thus providing a set of data and information 
that can contribute to the required assurances of 
the absence of undeclared activities and man-made 
structures of safeguards relevance.
In general, the monitoring methods contribute 
to the establishment and maintenance of a coherent 
and reliable set of data and information for the use 
in drawing safeguards conclusions at the geological 
repository site. These methods are, however, insen-
sitive to the amount of rock volume excavated or 
to the volume and shape the underground space 
produced. Therefore these can not be used for design 
information veriﬁcation, namely to establish cor-
respondence between the declared excavated rock 
volume and its declared shape and the one actually 
constructed.
Taking into account the complexity and novelty 
of the subject matter availability of appropriate non-
nuclear safeguards competencies must be secured at 
the inspectorates. It is recommended that the IAEA 
and the relevant other parties in Finland will nego-
tiate legally binding implementation arrangements 
so as to ensure that the national system functions 
will be implemented through out the whole lifetime 
of the repository project in a manner that enables 
the IAEA to implement its safeguards obligations 
in Finland effectively.
20
STUK- YTO-TR 216
References
Ahokas, H., Klockars, J. & Lahdenperä, A.-M. 2005. 
Results of monitoring at Olkiluoto in 2004: Hydrol-
ogy. Posiva Working Report 2005-28, 184 p.
Anttila, M. 2000. Intergrated safeguards for Fin-
land. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the FIN 
SP. STUK-YTO-TR 167, 17 p.
Cosgrove, J., Jokinen, J., Siivola, J. & Tiren, S. 2003. 
IMGS 2002 report. The geological and structural 
characterization of the Olkiluoto site in a critical 
perspective. STUK-YTO-TR 196, 19 p.
Haapanen R. 2005. Results of monitoring at Olkil-
uoto in 2004. Environment. Posiva Working Report 
2005-31, 127 p.
Hirvonen, H. 2005. Results of monitoring at Olkiluo-
to in 2004, Geochemistry. Posiva Working Report 
2005-29, 74 p.
IAEA, 1997. Safeguards for the ﬁnal disposal of 
spent fuel in geological repositories. STR-312. 5 
Volumes.
IAEA, 2003. Report of the experts meeting on in-
terface issues and interaction between safeguards 
and radioactive waste management in the context 
of geological repositories. STR-338. 27 p.
Juhola, P. 2005.Results of monitoring at Olkiluoto 
in 2004: Foreign Materials. Posiva Working Report 
2005-27, 18 p
Löfman, J. & Meszaros, F. 2005. Simulation of 
hydraulic disturbances caused by the underground 
rock characterisation facility in Olkiluoto. Posiva 
2005-08, 92 p.
Öhberg, A. 2006. Investigation equipment and 
methods used by Posiva. Posiva Working Report, in 
preparation.
Okko, O. (ed.) 2003. Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal 
of spent fuel. Methods and technologies for the 
Olkiluoto site. STUK-YTO-TR 199.
Okko, O. (ed.) 2004. Establishment of IAEA knowl-
edge of integrity of the geological repository bounda-
ries and disposed spent fuel assemblies in the 
context of the Finnish geological repository. STUK-
YTO-TR 207.
Okko O., Rautjärvi J. 2004. Safeguards for the geo-
logical repository at Olkiluoto in the pre-operational 
phase. STUK-YTO-TR 208, 30 p.
Posiva Oy, 2003. Baseline conditions at Olkiluoto. 
Posiva 2003-02, 220 p.
Posiva Oy, 2003. ONKALO, Underground charac-
terisation and research programme (UCRP). Posiva 
2003-03, 142 p.
Posiva Oy, 2003. ONKALO, Underground rock char-
acterisation facility – main drawings stage. Posiva 
Working Report 2003-26, 71 p.
Riikonen, S. 2005. Results of monitoring at Olkiluoto 
in 2004. Rock Mechanics. Posiva Working Report 
2005-30, 43 p.
Saari, J., 2005. Local Seismic Network at the Olki-
luoto Site. Annual Report for Posiva 2002–2004. 
Working Report 2005-48, 32 p.
Saksa P., Heikkinen E., Lehtimäki T., 2005. Geo-
physical radar method for safeguards application 
at Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal site in Finland. 
STUK-YTO-TR 213. 56 p.
STUK- YTO-TR 216
21
APPENDIX 1 Investigation methods applied at the 
Olkiluoto site
(Öhberg, 2006)
Method Application Data obtained Safeguards-relevance Safeguards-applicability
Hydrology in boreholes timely obtained point-
like samples
interpreted results, no 
direct sg-conclusions can 
be drawn
Increases site 
understanding, indications 
on undeclared activities 
may be obtained
Flow logging Hydraulic (continuous) 
proﬁles along borehole
Hydraulic testing Point-like hydraulic 
data
Water loss tests Permeability near the 
borehole
Multi-packer 
monitoring
Continuous data on 
hydraulic heads
Pressurised water 
sampling
Chemical water 
samples
Geophysics on ground surface Spatial data, 
interpreted subsurface 
points/proﬁles
Limited penetration/
resolution in repository, no 
direct sg-conclusions can 
be drawn
Increases site 
understanding, indications 
on undeclared activities 
may be obtained
Slingram survey resistivity-depth points/
proﬁles
Refraction survey interpreted seismic 
cross-section
Resistivity sounding resistivity-depth points/
proﬁles
EM (Geﬁnix 400S) 
sounding
resistivity-depth points/
proﬁles
Ground penetrating 
radar
interpreted cross-
section
Charged potential interpreted cross-
section
Geophysics in boreholes Interpreted proﬁles 
along and around 
boreholes
Advanced penetration/
resolution, no direct sg-
conclusion can be drawn
Increases site 
understanding, indications 
on undeclared activities 
may be obtained
Geophysical logging Interpreted proﬁles
Optical televiewer Visualised proﬁle
Borehole radar Cross-section near-by 
the borehole
Seismic crosshole Cross-section between 
boreholes
Seismic VSP Imaged reﬂectors in the 
rock mass
Rock 
mechanics
on ground and in the 
subsurface
Direct or interpreted 
point-like data
Direct measurements 
of rock stability, may be 
analysed for sg-purposes
Increases site 
understanding, indications 
on undeclared activities 
may be obtained
GPS network Timely point data on 
ground movements
Precise levelling Timely point-data on 
vertical movements 
Seismic monitoring Continuous point data 
on epicentres
3D-laser scanning Timely point data on 
tunnel walls
Rock stress 
measurements
Timely point data in 
boreholes
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APPENDIX 2 Model Arrangement to facilitate the IAEA 
Safeguards in the pre-nuclear phase of a repository
MODEL
Safeguards Arrangements between State and the IAEA 
during the excavation of “Rock Characterization Facility” 
associated with the Geological Repository of Spent Fuel
1. Preambular 
The general guiding values identiﬁed hereby are aimed at ensuring that effective safeguards 
can be implemented at the time the underground installation is forming a part of the licensed 
nuclear facility under construction.
During the pre-nuclear excavation phase particular care will be taken, that
• Measured geometry and volume of extracted rock correspond to the actual size and struc-
ture; 
• Respective data and information are generated, documented, made timely available for 
veriﬁcation by the relevant parties;
• Periodic as-build-design information veriﬁcation is carried out in accordance with the 
agreed practices, and that
• Assurances will be there of the absence of any undeclared underground activities and 
structures of safeguards relevance.
The nature of continuing underground excavation work with blasting activities requires that 
speciﬁc safety and security provisions in force must be respected by all parties. Therefore 
advance notiﬁcation procedures shall complied with so that the operational safety require-
ments can be adhered to and non-intrusive inspection and monitoring activities facilitated.
The following principal considerations are important in ensuring safe and timely access as 
well as efﬁciency in the implementation of the required safeguards measures:
• The frequency and intensity of activities described in this Arrangement shall be kept to 
the minimum consistent with the objective of efﬁcient safeguards. 
• The operator needs to be informed at least one week in advance of a need to carry out 
routine activities in the underground premises. 
• The advance notiﬁcation shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons of access, identify 
the designated inspectors, propose the inspection date(s), and the activities to be carried 
out during the inspection.
• The IAEA will respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in 
force.
• The IAEA shall not communicate to any State, organization or person any information 
obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Arrangement.
STUK- YTO-TR 216
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MODEL ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR PHASE OF A REPOSITORY APPENDIX 2
2. Purpose and scope 
The Arrangements are applicable to the pre-nuclear construction phase of the underground 
rock characterisation facility; the installation1. This installation is expected to form a part 
of the ﬁnal repository of spent nuclear fuel after licensing as a nuclear facility under con-
struction is foreseen to take place after the rock characterisation period of 8–10 years. The 
emplacement of the spent fuel into the repository is planned to begin 5–10 years later.
The purpose of the early implementation of IAEA safeguards measures is to ensure that 
the veriﬁed design information will be available at the time when the installation is catego-
rized as a Facility under construction, as required by the IAEA safeguards system. Further to 
this, timely implementation of the appropriate measures by the IAEA will ensure that there 
is now and at that time credible assurance of the absence of undeclared rock spaces, activities 
and materials of safeguards relevance.
These Arrangements are aimed at regulating the cooperation between State Authority 
and the IAEA in the implementation of the required safeguards measures during the whole 
life time of the repository. These Arrangements are not limiting nor expanding the rights and 
obligations stipulated in the relevant Safeguards Agreements.
The State will keep the Regional Authority informed about the safeguards procedure until 
the time when the installation becomes a facility under construction and will be subject to 
safeguards measures and reporting system also of the Regional Authority.
3. Arrangements
3.1 Scope of arrangements
The arrangements hereinafter describe the activities of the Operator and State Authority that 
are considered necessary so as to enable the Agency to fulﬁl its safeguards requirements.
The arrangement covers the following areas:
• Ascertaining the intactness of the host rock as an initial condition;
• Monitoring of the progress in excavation work;
• Generation of the “As-Build-Design-Information” and its veriﬁcation;
• Measures of the State Authority and the IAEA contributing to the credible assurances of 
the absence of undeclared materials and activities;
• Review of the implementation.
The implementation of these agreed procedures are facilitated by timely generation and provi-
sion of information about the excavation programmes, notiﬁcations of particular activities 
and reports of the results the required safeguards measures. List of the respective documents 
including associated timing and frequency of their submission are included in the Table at-
tached to these Arrangements as Annex 1.
3.2 Ascertaining the intactness of the host rock at the initial state 
The arrangements that will follow rest on the understanding the rock formation at geologi-
cal disposal site aimed at hosting the repository is conﬁrmed to form an intact rock volume 
that, prior to the excavation work, did not incorporate any natural or human made voids of 
1 The rock characterisation facility is hereby categorized as INSTALLATION. At the 
time of licensing the INSTALLATION will become part of the nuclear FACILITY 
under construction.
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APPENDIX 2 MODEL ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR PHASE OF A REPOSITORY
safeguards relevance. The natural state of the hosting rock mass is disturbed only by a small 
number of exploratory boreholes and borehole based hydrological tests.
Information from the State to the IAEA
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.2.1 Provision of the pertinent information about 
the host rock and excavation plans
Before underground excava-
tion procedures.
Information from the IAEA to the State
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.2.2 Request for further information or for other 
follow-up activity
ASAP
3.23 Request for access for veriﬁcation or monitor-
ing purposes 
One week in advance2
3.2.4 Information about the result of the IAEA activ-
ity
Within 60 days after the 
activity
3.3 Monitoring of the progress in excavation work
The independent State Authority veriﬁes the safeguards relevant data and information gener-
ated by the Operator, analyses and evaluates the results. The State Authority communicates 
its ﬁndings i.a. to the IAEA in order to enable it to implement the required measures of the 
IAEA safeguards system.
Information from the State to the IAEA
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.3.1 Main plans and drawings January/ Once a year
3.3.1.1 Updating Quarterly / Annually
3.3.1.2 Changes to the plans 2 weeks prior to implement.
3.3.2 Notiﬁcation of the work that will permanently 
cover the rock surfaces 
3.3.2.1 Notiﬁcation of concrete spraying 2 weeks prior to implement.
3.3.2.2 Notiﬁcation of spraying for safety purposes ASAP
3.3.2.3 Notiﬁcation of concrete casting 2 weeks prior to implement.
3.3.3 Notiﬁcation of any unexpected event or work 
of relevance to safeguards implementation
ASAP
3.3.4 Provision of progress report Quarterly
2 In case instruments are used advance approval shall be obtained in good 
time.
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MODEL ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR PHASE OF A REPOSITORY APPENDIX 2
Information from the IAEA to the State
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.3.5 Request for further information or for other 
follow-up activity
ASAP
3.3.6 Request for access for routine veriﬁcation or 
monitoring purpose 
One week in advance
3.4.4 Information about the result of the IAEA 
routine activity 
Within 60 days after the 
activity
3.4 Generation of “As-Build -Design Information” and its veriﬁcation
The State Authority inspects, in accordance with its inspection plan, the safeguards-relevant 
measurements carried out by the Operator (Annex 1, Items 9 and 10) and analyses and 
evaluates the generated data and information so as to ensure that it corresponds with the 
actual rock space excavated during the reporting period. The State Authority will inform the 
Operator of its ﬁndings, including any corrective actions that need to be taken care prior to 
the submitting the respective documentation to IAEA. 
Information from the State to the IAEA
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.4.1 “As-Build-Design Information” document Quarterly
Information from the IAEA to the State
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.4.2 Request for further information or for other 
follow-up activity
ASAP
3.4.3 Request for access for veriﬁcation purpose One week in advance
3.4.4 Information about the result of the IAEA 
assessments 
Within 60 days after the 
receipt of the A-B-D-I
When assurances are there at IAEA that the “As-Build-Design-Information” document cor-
responds with the respective excavated structure the State Authority will inform the Operator. 
The “As-Build-Design-Information” document is thereby validated as a reliable data and 
information for the future use in safeguards implementation.
The Operator and the State Authority as well as the IAEA will maintain identical copies 
of these Documents. These Documents will subsequently contribute to the formal Design 
Information3 to be submitted to the IAEA through appropriate means and ways at the time 
the installation would be licensed as a nuclear facility under construction.
3 DIQ to be developed by the IAEA, BTC by the Regional Authority, Euro-
pean Commission. The submission of the DI will be via European Commis-
sion safeguards 200 days prior to emplacement of Nuclear Material in the 
disposal facility.
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APPENDIX 2 MODEL ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR PHASE OF A REPOSITORY
3.5  Particular measures by STUK and the IAEA aimed at contributing to credible 
assurances of the absence of undeclared safeguards relevant materials and activities 
The State Authority will periodically audit the Operators system and its performance. Further 
to that, the State Authority will regulate the conditions and circumstances as well as activities 
in the area so as to be in a position to judge possible safeguards relevance.
The State Authority will periodically assess the results of its activities, including such 
as environmental monitoring and area surveillance, and inform the Operator, or any other 
relevant party, of its ﬁndings, including any issues that need to be further clariﬁed.
Information from the State to the IAEA
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.5.1 Findings and issues of relevance to safeguards Quarterly
Information from the IAEA to the State
No Description Timing / Frequency
3.5.2 Request for further information or for other 
follow-up activity
ASAP
3.5.3 Request for access for veriﬁcation or monitor-
ing purposes 
One week in advance4
3.5.4 Information about the result of the IAEA as-
sessments 
Within 60 days after the 
receipt of the A-B-D-I
3.6 Review of the implementation 
The State Authority and the IAEA will conduct a review meeting on implementation each 
year. The purpose is to ensure that all issues of safeguards relevance have been and, in case 
of unresolved questions or anomalies, will be timely and appropriately addressed.
4 In case instruments are used advance approval shall be obtained in good 
time.
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MODEL ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR PHASE OF A REPOSITORY APPENDIX 2
ANNEX 1 Access to information, people and physical 
premises to enable IAEA safeguards measures
Activity Type Availablility of info Updating Notiﬁcation
1. Main plans and drawings (relevant parts) Annual January Quarterly
Changes to the plans Ad-Hoc 2 weeks prior to impl.
2. Surveying programme (As-build data gen.) Routine Quarterly NA NA
3. Concrete spraying Semi-Ann. Quarterly As soon as known 2 weeks prior to impl.
4. Spraying for safety purposes Ad-Hoc Need to know basis NA As soon as possible
5. Concrete casting Semi-Ann. Quarterly As soon as known 2 weeks prior.
6. Monitoring vibration and acceleration Periodic Quarterly NA NA
7. Microseismic monitoring Periodic Quarterly NA NA
8. Geo-environmental monitoring Continuous twice a year As soon as known 3–6 months prior
9. On-site inspections by State Authority Routine See inspection plan NA NA
10. Internal audit by State Authority Annual See QA-manual NA NA
11. As-build design information Periodic Quarterly NA NA
12. Report by State Authority Annual in February NA NA
13. Regional Authority's visits Ad-Hoc As need araises NA NA
Note: Physical access to premises is constrained by safety and security precautions of the facility.
